French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel might well hold the future of Europe in their hands. Or maybe more accurately in their cheque books. Round table with Anne-Laure Delatte, Lorenzo Marsili, Daniel Stelter, and Olaf Wientzek, on France 24 on 30 june 2020.

The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerability of the Old continent to drug-supply disruption. Europe nevertheless remains, by far, the leader in the global trade of pharmaceutical products. Article published in The Conversation on May 31, 2020

More than three years after the Brexit referendum, Brexit is still not settled, but the uncertainty remains. This long period of uncertainty has cost around half a point of economic growth per year since 2016 for the UK’s economy, which is equivalent to an annual loss of £16 billion.

Europe’s competition policy has successfully contained the rise in concentration and excess profits, and the EU should not follow the US in weakening its approach. Instead, the EU needs to strengthen its trade policy to be more assertive on reciprocity in market access and control of industrial subsidies.

The shock caused by the 2007-08 financial collapse, followed by the European sovereign debt crisis, has raised new doubts about the ability of the single currency to work well in a region with huge economic and political diversity. It has also given a new dimension to this debate by highlighting the building-up of unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances within the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Stocks and sovereign bonds are among the most used financial products and the correlation between stock and bond returns corresponds to a typically time-varying pattern reflecting changes in investors' decisions.

The agenda to fix the euro is hampered by conflicting national interests. Creditor countries demand fiscal house cleaning and debtor countries ask for risk sharing. There is currently a political deadlock about how the adjustment burden should be distributed, perpetuating a state of vulnerability that is not in the collective interest of euro area members. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that overcoming this coordination failure requires reforming the political governance of the EU, rather than just its economic governance.
This post has been first published on VoxEU.

On the occasion of its 40th anniversary, three panel discussions, CEPII brought together experts, foreign and French, decision-makers and academics to discuss the major challenges that France and Europe are facing ten years after the crisis and the deep transformation of the international economic relationships.
See videos et presentations.

Trade between Japan and the EU is not a big deal in world trade, barely more than 1%. Their Economic Partnership Agreement can nevertheless be very influential because, jointly, they are a party in more than 40% of world trade, and much more in innovative sectors.

IMF cuts global growth forecasts following Brexit vote. Paul Krugman has taken a different point of view by arguing there is no reason to worry in the immediate future. This opposition reflects clearly two different opinions on the short-term consequences of uncertainty.

European financial markets face a shortage of liquid assets. New regulations increase banks’ demand for liquid securities, mainly sovereign bonds, but the European fiscal rules constrain the supply of public debt. Further, the QE is draining bonds from the market. Some proposed forms of “Eurobonds” or new debt securities issued by European supranational organizations could solve this problem.

This column reports the nature and the amplitude of economic cycles in the Euro area since 1970, with a focus on the role of financial factors in generating these cycles.

Back in 2010, the Eurozone countries insisted a lot that the IMF provides exceptional financing to Greece. They will be duly reminded when the reckoning moment has come.

From May 21 to May 23, the ECB organized its 2nd annual forum on Central banking. Mario Draghi's inaugural speech, as well as discussions on May 23rd, focused mainly on the need for structural reforms to strengthen growth in Europe.

While European external surpluses are accumulating and domestic demand is slacking, insisting on improving the Union’s external competitiveness, as some in the Commission are presently doing, is paradoxical. For Europe, the paramount risk is not losing its competitiveness. It is not recovering cohesion and growth.

The ECB has announced that it will launch in March its first round of quantitative easing. The announcement contains some good and bad surprises: the size of the ECB's plan is gigantic, while the Central Bank was unclear about the Greek issue. How was this announcement perceived by markets?

Instead of buying sovereign debt, the ECB could broaden further its purchases to include equity of all sorts. Fuelling an equity bubble is no worse than fuelling a bond one. It can be mitigated by intervening secretly and including non listed securities. Inhibitions to take risk should be lifted.

The long awaited Juncker Plan for investment in Europe has arrived a few weeks ago. Beyond the creation of a Strategic Fund, the Plan as a whole has disappointed: not adamant enough to eliminate the deep obstacles to cross-border investment, and opaque in generating the “List” of projects to be financed. Yet, even imperfectly, Europe has now done its homework.

The ECB has confirmed its determination to counter the risk of deflation in the eurozone by evoking the possibility of sovereign bond purchases, but is confronted once again with the heterogeneity of the area. The need for compromise could jeopardize the effectiveness of its action.

European policymakers are currently busy addressing two issues: moribund investment and banks on extended sick leave. Some observers might be tempted to segregate these issues. While investment would be in the remit of States, the financial health of our economies would be under the responsibility of the ECB alone.